{"id":9747,"date":"2021-06-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2021-06-09T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/aspeninstitutece.softmedia.cz\/article\/2021\/secret-sauce-america\/"},"modified":"2024-09-30T19:22:49","modified_gmt":"2024-09-30T17:22:49","slug":"secret-sauce-america","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/article\/2021\/secret-sauce-america\/","title":{"rendered":"The Secret Sauce of America"},"content":{"rendered":"

Biden\u2019s ideas may prove flawed, but they are coherent. And the fact that his administration does not build a wall between foreign and domestic policy is an asset not a liability.<\/strong><\/p>\n

16 minutes. That is how long it took China\u2019s top diplomat, Yang Jiechim to vent his grievances against American foreign policy, the country\u2019s global standing, and the condition of American democracy. It would not come as a surprise were it not for the circumstances. Yang did not utter his words at some China Communist Party\u2019s forum in Beijing but in Anchorage, Alaska with American top diplomats \u2013 Secretary of State, Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan \u2013 sitting right across the table.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt is important for the United States to change its own image and to stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world\u201d, Yang said, adding that \u201cmany people within the United States actually have little confidence in the democracy of the United States\u201d.<\/p>\n

In his speech, Xi Jinping\u2019s confidant accused the US of, among other things, provoking other countries to attack China, disrupting free trade, and overstretching \u201cthe national security through the use of force or financial hegemony\u201d. As Blinken and Sullivan did not pull their rhetorical punches either \u2013 mentioning CCP\u2019s actions against the Uighurs, Hong-Kong and Taiwan, as well as accusing China of undermining the global rules-based order \u2013 Yang eventually fired back that \u201cthe United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength\u201d.1<\/sup><\/p>\n

The incident sparked numerous comments about the new low Sino-American relations have reached, as well as warnings about possible escalation. And yet, shocking as the exchange might seem, it should not have been surprising. As \u201cThe Economist\u201d rightly pointed out \u201clong before it started, it was clear that the first high-level meeting between America and China during Joe Biden\u2019s presidency would be deemed a success only if it appeared to go badly\u201d.2<\/sup><\/p>\n

Just two weeks before the meeting in Anchorage, in his first major address as the Secretary of State Blinken called relations with China \u201cthe biggest geopolitical test of the twenty-first century\u201d. \u201cChina\u201d, he said \u201cis the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system \u2013 all the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to\u201d. He went on to announce that although the\u00a0US relationship with China \u201cwill be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be\u201d, Washington will engage China \u201cfrom the position of strength\u201d.3<\/sup>\u00a0Yang might not have liked the approach, but the new administration\u2019s position was clear before the talks began.<\/p>\n

Two Distinct Camps<\/h2>\n

It is therefore a mistake, to dismiss the whole incident simply as a display for domestic audiences in the respective countries. The meeting in Anchorage showed how slim are the chances for an imminent thaw in the icy relationship between the two global superpowers. It is obvious that the relatively peaceful times, when hopes for a G-2 world were high, are gone, and that the two countries are now in the process of creating two distinct camps. What is at stake now is how the two camps are going to be divided, and how hostile they may become. If this perspective is correct, then in Anchorage the American side seems to have achieved what it wanted.<\/p>\n

It is obvious that the relatively peaceful times, when hopes for a G-2 world were high, are gone, and that the two countries are now in the process of creating two distinct camps.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

First, Americans sent a clear signal that they do not intend to accept a reset in the relationship which China suggested back during the presidential campaign. As Thomas Wright of Brookings Institution pointed out in \u201cThe Atlantic\u201d: \u201cthe Biden team saw these overtures for what they were: a trap to get the US to pull back from competing with China in exchange for cooperation that would never really materialize\u201d. Biden officials knew \u2013 Wright argues \u2013 that instead of changing Beijing policy, the reset would only serve to buy the Chinese more time for their continued \u201cpush forward on all other fronts\u201d.4<\/sup><\/p>\n

Second, by prompting Yang and the foreign minister Wang Yi to openly display China\u2019s ambitions and intentions, Biden can dismiss any calls for a rapprochement with Xi Jinping, simply by pointing out what the Chinese said in Anchorage.<\/p>\n

Third, provoking China to pursue its more assertive, wolf-warrior style diplomacy could help Biden secure not only domestic support, but that of other countries as well. Mainly in Europe, which is currently debating its role in the era of conflict between the two superpowers. Biden and his people are certainly aware that some Europeans believe they may benefit from the US-China conflict by acting as a mediator, or as a potential ally whose support both sides crave. The more often China speaks about \u201cdeclining West and rising East\u201d, or \u2013 as Yang put it \u2013 about the competition between \u201cUnited States-style democracy\u201d, and \u201cChinese-style democracy\u201d, the more wary Europeans might become of their fate under the Chinese world order.<\/p>\n

Provoking China to pursue its more assertive, wolf-warrior style diplomacy could help Biden secure not only domestic support, but that of other countries as well. Mainly in Europe, which is currently debating its role.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Sentiments Towards Beijing Grew All Over the World<\/h2>\n

Democratic leaders can hardly ignore popular sentiments, and in case of relations with China these are clear \u2013 the more assertive China becomes the more fears it raises. Since the beginning of the pandemic, sentiments towards Beijing have grown sour all over the world \u2013 from Australia and Japan, through Germany and France, to Canada and the US. According to a Pew Research Center\u2019s survey, in each of these countries the number of people with unfavorable views of China has grown exponentially reaching 81 percent in Australia, 86 in Japan, 73 in the US and Canada, 71 in Germany and 70 in France.<\/p>\n

After they successfully contained the pandemic, Chinese authorities pushed hard with diplomatic efforts to promote an image of a benevolent global power with a highly effective system of government.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

All that in the year 2020 when China was supposed to triumphantly storm the global scene. After they successfully contained the pandemic, Chinese authorities pushed hard with diplomatic efforts to promote an image of a benevolent global power with a highly effective system of government.<\/p>\n

And yet the so-called mask diplomacy \u2013 at the time hailed as a tactical masterstroke \u2013 backfired as soon as it became obvious that many of the gifts sent to countries in need were in fact commercial sales of costly and often deficient equipment. Chinese aggressive reactions \u2013 threats and sanctions \u2013 to even modest questions about the origins of the pandemic, or calls for international investigations, did not help either.<\/p>\n

Biden\u2019s top diplomats probably approached the talks in Anchorage with a simple assumption \u2013 that by being boastful about their ambitions, the Chinese will not scare other countries into submission, but rather into seeking unity under Washington\u2019s leadership.<\/p>\n

Biden and his people have stated repeatedly that the current crises facing the world are too great for any country to tackle single-handedly. \u201cNot a single global challenge that affects your lives can be met by any one nation acting alone \u2013 not even one as powerful as the United States\u201d, Blinken said in his speech at the State Department, echoing similar statements made by Biden. By scaring partners away, Beijing is making Washington\u2019s job of rebuilding its alliances easier. Obviously, how this strategy evolves depends not only on China\u2019s rhetoric but also on America\u2019s perceived might, credibility and predictability.<\/p>\n

\u201cA Foreign Policy for the Middle Class\u201d<\/h2>\n

And here Biden\u2019s team also seems to have a plan, most often described by the concept of \u201ca foreign policy for the middle class\u201d. The idea has already been dismissed as elusive at best. \u201cWhen discussing how his foreign policy will help Americans\u201d – Jessica T. Mathews, former President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote in \u201cForeign Affairs\u201d \u2013 \u201cBiden tends to veer quickly from trade to other issues: a higher minimum wage, better education, more affordable health care. All of those are important, but none is the province of foreign policy\u201d. The same goes, claims Mathews, for Biden\u2019s slogan to \u201cBuild Back Better\u201d and his promise of massive investments in infrastructure. \u201cThe more closely one examines the specifics, the more the concept of a foreign policy for the middle class slips away\u201d, she concludes.5<\/sup><\/p>\n

I beg to differ. Biden\u2019s ideas may prove flawed, but they are coherent. And the fact that his administration does not build a wall between foreign and domestic policy is an asset not a liability. Relations with China may again serve well to illustrate the point.<\/p>\n

Biden\u2019s ideas may prove flawed, but they are coherent. And the fact that his administration does not build a wall between foreign and domestic policy is an asset not a liability.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Among the reasons behind China\u2019s increasing assertiveness one evoked most often is a growing conviction of the United States in \u2013 as Kevin Rudd put it \u2013 \u201csteady, irreversible structural decline\u201d.6<\/sup> The former Australian Prime Minister is right when he says such a belief \u2013 reflected in Chinese political literature \u2013 \u201cis now grounded in a considerable body of evidence\u201d. Growing economic inequality, political polarization which renders the Congress virtually paralyzed, racial tensions, collapsing infrastructure, the rise of the radical right and the threat of domestic terrorism, eroded alliances, and the declining level of trust among American allies \u2013 these are all real and mounting challenges facing the new administration. That is why Joe Biden needs to act swiftly and simultaneously on many different levels. Rudd argues that the President \u201cintends to prove Beijing wrong in its assessment that the United States is now in irreversible decline. He will seek to use his extensive experience on Capitol Hill to forge a domestic economic strategy to rebuild the foundations of\u00a0US power in the post-pandemic world\u201d.<\/p>\n

Biden Needs to Deliver to the American People<\/h2>\n

Seen from this perspective, Biden\u2019s huge economic stimulus signed into law in mid-March is an instrument of both domestic and foreign policy. The same applies to other significant pieces of legislation coming down the pipe: from infrastructure and climate change bills to the already famous \u201cFor the People Act\u201d \u2013 which intends, among other things, to facilitate the voting processes, increase turnout and cut down on gerrymandering. All these initiatives, however, have very slim chances of passing through a Senate crippled by a filibuster.<\/p>\n

Without rebuilding strong alliances Biden will not be able to achieve foreign policy goals which can be demonstrated as beneficial to the American people.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

One might argue I am now mixing diverse issues together. In fact, all I am trying to say is that if Biden\u2019s foreign policy agenda is ambitious \u2013 and we can agree it is \u2013 then an ambitious domestic agenda is necessary for it to succeed. And vice versa. Without delivering to the American people (and challenging voter suppression), Democrats have no chance of retaining their control over Congress after the 2022 mid-term elections. We can safely assume that should they lose their majority, the US. will again become ungovernable, or \u2013 to be more precise \u2013 governable through executive orders only. And one does not build confidence among allies by introducing policies which can be reversed by a stroke of a pen of whoever enters the White House in 2024 or 2028. Finally, without rebuilding strong alliances Biden will not be able to achieve foreign policy goals which can be demonstrated as beneficial to the American people.<\/p>\n

Jake Sullivan declared during the presidential campaign that in its relations with China the new administration \u201cshould put less focus on trying to slow China down and more emphasis on trying to run faster ourselves\u201d.7<\/sup> They also seem to believe that the country will not run faster without comprehensive reforms and public investment strategy.<\/p>\n

After the first exchange with their Chinese counterparts in Anchorage, Sullivan said that \u201ca confident country is able to look hard at its own shortcomings and constantly seek to improve. And that is the secret sauce of America\u201d. One can argue that the new administration\u2019s plan is somehow misguided. But it is ambitious, coherent and \u2013 which comes as a welcome change \u2013 it is there.<\/p>\n

\n
    \n
  1. Secretary Antony J. Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Director Yang and State Councilor Wang At the Top of Their Meeting, 18 March 2011; https:\/\/www.state.gov\/secretary-antony-j-blinken-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-chinese-director-of-the-office-of-the-central-commission-for-foreign-affairs-yang-jiechi-and-chinese-state-councilor-wang-yi-at-th\/<\/a><\/li>\n
  2. A hostile meeting sets the tone for US-China relations, The Economist, 20 March 2021; https:\/\/www.economist.com\/china\/2021\/03\/20\/a-hostile-meeting-sets-the-tone-for-us-china-relations<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. Antony Blinken, \u201cA Foreign Policy for the American People\u201d, 3 March 2021; https:\/\/www.state.gov\/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people\/<\/a><\/li>\n
  4. Thomas Wright, \u201cThe US and China Finally Get Real With Each Other\u201d, The Atlantic, 21 March 2021; https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2021\/03\/the-us-and-china-finally-get-real-with-each-other\/618345\/<\/a><\/li>\n
  5. Jessica T. Mathews, Present at the Re-creation?\u00a0US Foreign Policy Must Be Remade, Not Restored, Foreign Affairs March\/April 2021 https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/united-states\/2021-02-16\/present-re-creation<\/li>\n
  6. Kevin Rudd, Short of War. How to Keep US-Chinese Confrontation From Ending in Calamity, Foreign Affairs, March\/April, 2021; https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/united-states\/2021-02-05\/kevin-rudd-usa-chinese-confrontation-short-of-war<\/a><\/li>\n
  7. David E. Sanger, Michael Crowley, \u201cAntony Blinken and Jake Sullivan Will Meet their Chinese Counterparts in what May be a Tense First Encounter\u201d. The New York Times, March 18, 2021; https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/03\/18\/us\/antony-blinken-and-jake-sullivan-will-meet-their-chinese-counterparts-in-what-may-be-a-tense-first-encounter.html<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

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    Biden\u2019s ideas may prove flawed, but they are coherent. And the fact that his administration does not build a wall between foreign and domestic policy is an asset not a liability. 16 minutes. That is how long it took China\u2019s top diplomat, Yang Jiechim to vent his grievances against American foreign policy, the country\u2019s global […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[363,493,130],"class_list":["post-9747","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-nezarazene","tag-aylp","tag-biden","tag-usa"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9747","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/18"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9747"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9747\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10881,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9747\/revisions\/10881"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9747"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9747"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9747"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}