{"id":9763,"date":"2021-10-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2021-10-11T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/aspeninstitutece.softmedia.cz\/article\/2021\/people-first-liberalism\/"},"modified":"2024-09-30T19:19:22","modified_gmt":"2024-09-30T17:19:22","slug":"people-first-liberalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspeninstitutece.org\/cs\/article\/2021\/people-first-liberalism\/","title":{"rendered":"To Counter Populists We Need a „People First“ Kind of Liberalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

You have very capable and dynamic young people joining parties on both ends of the spectrum. It means that the younger generation will not only be more open and green than the previous ones, but also more polarized\u2014says Michal \u0160ime\u010dka in an interview with Jakub Dymek.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Jakub Dymek: Do you feel confident about the future of liberal democracies in Central Europe?<\/b><\/h2>\n

Michal \u0160ime\u010dka: <\/b>Pretty much. It’ll be harder, for sure. The corona crisis had made general conditions for liberal democracies worse, but on the other hand, the gravest risks have not actually materialized. There was a genuine scare that the autocrats and would-be autocrats will seize power and exploit the uncertainty. This dark scenario hasn’t yet materialized.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What has hurt liberalism and democracy in Central Europe is a couple of things. The epidemic wasn’t handled well\u2014with some exceptions. It wasn’t the best example of how to utilise the state and it’s resources. The pandemic did not necessarily inspire confidence in the liberal-democratic state. The second reason is of course economic uncertainty. Last year wasn’t especially generous for liberals and democrats in our part of Europe. But on the other hand we have vigorous new parties in all countries of the region, young populations with diverse views and interesting political coalitions reshaping political scenes. So on balance, the picture is not as bleak as one could think.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Do you still think that terms like \u2018populist\u2019 or \u2018extremist\u2019 are still as relevant as they used to be? Parties considered populist and insurgent, like Fidesz in Hungary or PiS in Poland, are poised to be longest ruling political factions in their countries post 1989. What was previously considered marginal is the political mainstream of today.\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

Yes, both Poland and Hungary are not the typical case of populist movements getting into power and then, soon after, being voted out of power because of their incompetence. These parties however are much more skilled in exercising power than people thought ten years ago and they’re making everything to stay in power for as long as it is possible. This is especially true for Hungary where the government shapes the elections law so it is harder and harder to actually win against them.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What’s more important is that these parties have canonized and monopolized a certain kind of conservative politics which combines the redistributive role of the state with traditionalist vision of society and nationalist attitudes towards Brussels and the West in general. This, unfortunately, has become a mainstream ideological position. You can see bits and pieces of this everywhere, where there are attempts to elevate Central and Eastern Europe as somehow a more \u201enormal“ alternative to corrupt and weak Western Europe. And these attitudes will outlast the parties that promote them today. This to me\u2014as a liberal\u2014is a worrying bit.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What kind of liberalism would be most efficient in your opinion to counter this proposition?\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

This goes back to the question of who our opponents are. Poland may be a prime example of how new conservative parties promoted family oriented and redistributive social policies. They’ve moved to the left on economic affairs quite a lot. In the meantime the world has moved away from the neoliberal consensus as well, which is visible for example when you look at the conclusions of the recent G7 summit.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is an international understanding that runaway capitalism and globalization must be contained\u2014by the state, by putting common goods and public interest on the pedestal again<\/span>, returning to \u201cpeople first\u201d kind of politics.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Any liberal party, any liberal movement and any possible future for liberalism must take this into account.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One could argue that until recently the EU was itself instrumental in forcing neoliberal and austerity policies on its members.\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

The economic crisis we’re experiencing because of the pandemic have obviously changed that, but I’d say that this paradigm had been dented first by academics and later by broader changes in public perceptions of the market and lesseiz-fare policies. European Rescue Fund and all the emergency measures are an obvious manifestation of that. But even before there was enough readiness to embrace that kind of a change. Inevitably more and more people are seeing that we cannot do without social cohesion, without investing in people and reducing inequalities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

How are changing demographics influencing this landscape in your opinion?<\/b><\/h2>\n

Speaking from Slovakia I can say that obviously the younger generation disapproves of this status quo and you can see how big a percentage goes to radical parties on both ends of the spectrum in simulated elections in high schools. This of course means not only big gains for liberals and progressives, but fascists also. The same is true for young politicians: you have very capable and dynamic young people joining parties on both ends of the spectrum, too. So what this means is that the younger generation will not only be more open and green than the previous ones, but also more polarized.<\/span><\/p>\n

Data\u2014at least in Poland\u2014shows that this younger generation is indeed more liberal, progressive and tolerant, but at the same time not egalitarian. It looks more like a shift towards individualism, not a drift towards the left.\u00a0<\/b><\/h2>\n

I don’t have the data and I’m ready to stand corrected, but my gut tells me it’s not the case everywhere.<\/span><\/p>\n

Whole generation of young people in Slovakia have moved westward\u2014to Bratislava or abroad. But they’ve left\u2014<\/span>both metaphorically and quite literally\u2014<\/span>their parents behind. And because of that I believe, there are acutely aware of the disparities and regional divides.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

For some, maybe, their own success will translate into more libertarian politics\u2014but in general, this is the generation not so far divorced from the harsher realities of small towns and villages.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Speaking more generally about inequalities, you cannot leave the pandemic out of the picture. Europeans witnessed many new types of inequality and divisions\u2014who gets to hospital sooner, who is taken care of, who gets to work and who gets paid leave, how fast you can get care to your loved ones and who you have to call to help them. These are the types of inequalities that our citizenry witnessed with their own eyes and that the liberals must take care of.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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#COVID19<\/a> impact on employment income: According to advanced estimates on income inequality and poverty indicators, the estimated loss for median employment income at EU level is -5.2% in 2020 compared with 2019. #StatisticsExplained<\/a> <\/p>\n

More info: https:\/\/t.co\/IaEgrIpDUS<\/a> pic.twitter.com\/xokBbj11QC<\/a><\/p>\n

— EU_Eurostat (@EU_Eurostat) December 10, 2020<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n