The Germans have an election. Its outcome is unclear. The parties take their time in forming a coalition. Once formed, the new government’s \u201cGerman foreign policy\u201d, as Chancellor Olaf Scholz immediately stressed, \u201cis a policy of continuity\u201d. \u201cI would like to continue with the northeast German mentality that has prevailed here up to now,\u201d he said. \u201cNot so much will change there,\u201d he added. So far, so familiar.<\/p>\n
But does this ring true? There are two reasons why it may not in fact be business as usual. First, the new Foreign Minister, the Green Party’s Annalena Baerbock, has signalled that she intends to break from the past in significant ways. This involves shaking off the indulgent view of China and Russia that Merkel often took\u2014viewing them instead in a much more sceptical light. This means a tougher line on China and Russia regarding sanctions, human rights and Nord Stream 2. Secondly, there is likely to be a significant shift on Europe. This will probably lead to a tightening up of the German approach to rule breakers within the European Union, and more attention being given to a German European grand strategy and deeper European integration.<\/span><\/p>\n Much of this has already been \u2018priced\u2019 in by analysts and government. It is no secret that as Foreign Minister, Baerbock is coming in with a roster of new opinions and approaches that break with Merkel\u2019s direction. She is adopting a structurally different approach\u2014human rights and environment prioritized over economic interest. The open question is whether the general assumption that she will be tempered and diluted by Chancellor Scholz is justified. In fact, as we shall see, there is reason to think that on at least one issue, Olaf Scholz is a more radical thinker than many realize.<\/span><\/p>\n Let us begin with the rhetorical shifts. Baerbock wants a foreign policy \u201cguided by human rights and values\u201d. She is also keen to use both carrot and stick, declaring that, \u201cFor me, a value-based foreign policy is always an interplay of dialogue and toughness.\u201d As one of the Greens\u2019 most prominent foreign policy figures, Franziska Brantner, says, \u201cWe have to stop [equating] German interests with German economic interests\u2026We as Germans really have to change course<\/span>.<\/b> If we continue, we will pay a very heavy price.\u201d<\/span> Or to quote<\/span> Jens Althoff of the party\u2019s own Heinrich B\u00f6ll Foundation, \u201cAnnalena Baerbock no longer wants a foreign policy that is driven solely by the country’s economic interests\u201d. All this signals a plan to reverse the Merkel years\u2019 prioritization of commercial interests at the expense of a crackdown on human rights. It is a turn away from the old German strategy of<\/span> Wandel durch Handel \u2013 change through trade<\/span>\u00a0\u2013\u00a0<\/b>which goes back to the heady days of Ostpolitik and d\u00e9tente in the late 1960s and 1970s.<\/span><\/p>\n The practical effects of the shift will first be tested by relations with Russia, especially with regard to the two core issues Nord Stream 2 and Ukraine. So far, the German watchword has been what the Financial Times calls \u201ccontinued engagement\u201d with Putin. This is rooted in a long and complex relationship with Moscow, harking back to the Cold War. Central to it is the dependency on Russian energy, which was accentuated by the post-Fukushima decision to bail out of nuclear power. This makes Berlin inclined to avoid tension in order to ensure the continued supply of oil and gas, making the Nord Stream II pipeline across the Baltic Sea operational without further delay. This was so important to Germany, that one of the first foreign policy initiatives of the Biden administration was to withdraw its own objections to the scheme, not out of love for Putin but deference to Merkel.<\/span> There is also a broader German hesitation about taking on Russia, which is partly driven by fear but also by guilt over Nazi behaviour during the Second World War. As<\/span> John Lough puts it in <\/span>Germany<\/span><\/i>\u2019<\/span>s Russia Problem, <\/span><\/i>\u201cGermany\u2019s historically conditioned reflexes have distorted its view of Russia and continue to inhibit its behaviour\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n Now the language, at least, is hardening. There is genuine worry among the new government that Russia might invade Ukraine, a US assessment shared only recently by Germany.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Berlin\u2019s moves on this will be a test and indicate how the Germans wish to proceed in the European geopolitical arena. Baerbock has already been implicitly critical of Merkel\u2019s approach to Russia, complaining that, \u201csome seem to prefer to close their eyes to reality and hope that it won\u2019t be so bad. That usually doesn\u2019t work when it comes to Russia.\u201d Whether Scholz and Baerbock will diverge on the Ukrainian situation is unclear. Their rhetoric is currently similar with Scholz emphasizing that, \u201cWe have a very clear attitude: we want everyone’s borders to be respected\u201d, echoed by Baerbock\u2019s statement that, \u201cUkraine\u2019s territorial integrity and sovereignty are not negotiable.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n The divide on Nord Stream 2, by contrast, is clearer. While Scholz and much of the opposition and public opinion support it, the Greens vehemently oppose it, with Baerbock stating that, \u201cWe can\u2019t allow ourselves to be blackmailed\u201d by Russia. This matters because Nord Stream 2 is currently still subject to regulatory approval to ensure it complies with EU energy legislation. Whether the Greens have the capacity to block Nord Stream 2 for good is another matter. The fact that there was no mention of Nord Stream 2 in the coalition contract published in November can be interpreted either as a sign that it is a done deal, or that the matter is entirely up in the air.<\/span><\/p>\n One also needs to factor in the convergence of foreign policy and environmental sentiment on Nord Stream 2. An anti-Nord Stream movement in the vein of Fridays for Future would have the capacity to exert more domestic pressure on the new government. Lack of domestic pressure for action on Russia is viewed as one of the reasons that Scholz has been wary of adopting a harder approach. As Cathryn Cl\u00fcver Ashbrook has argued, \u201cThe biggest problem right now is that the German population doesn\u2019t sense the urgency\u2026It doesn\u2019t see the threat potential.\u201d That could change very quickly if Nord Stream 2 was reframed as an environmental, rather than a security, concern.<\/span><\/p>\n There are probably also changes ahead on the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC). Merkel was not completely silent on human rights abuses there, but she tended to mute her criticism in the interests of economic cooperation and German exports. This was especially evident as her authority ebbed during the last years of her Chancellorship. At the supranational level, Merkel was widely regarded as the driving force behind the EU\u2019s investment deal with China, which is currently on hold. More broadly, she has repeatedly warned against a lack of engagement and interaction between China and Europe. At the global level, Germany didn\u2019t take part in Donald Trump\u2019s US trade war against China.<\/span><\/p>\n This legacy has already been targeted by Baerbock.<\/span> In an open dig at Merkel\u2019s foreign policy, she told a German newspaper that, \u201cEloquent silence is not a form of diplomacy in the long run, even if it has been seen that way by some in recent years\u201d. Becoming more specific, Baerbock called the PRC a \u201csystematic competitor\u201d and called for \u201cstrategic solidarity with democratic partners, defending our values and interests together, and patiently advocating these values in our foreign policy.\u201d To this end, she has called for increased EU import duties on PRC firms that fall foul of European standards, rules against state subsidies or labor laws.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Even more importantly, Baerbock wants to align Germany\u2019s position with the USA. The coalition deal explicitly commits Berlin to, \u201cwork together with like-minded countries to reduce strategic dependencies\u201d.\u00a0 It is possible that she might follow the USA and UK in a diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympics in the PRC. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping is moving the country away from open access to international firms, reducing the economic pull-factor for Germany and Europe. In effect, Baerbock is looking to inverse Merkel\u2019s priorities, subordinating commercial interaction to a tougher line on human rights. Barebock\u2019s approach has not gone unnoticed on the Chinese side, with the Chinese Embassy in Berlin calling for \u201cbridge builders instead of wall builders.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Finally, there is the question of Europe. It is widely assumed that, as <\/span>The<\/span><\/i> Guardian<\/span><\/i> recently claimed, \u201cNone of the parties that will make up the new government have promised a radical change in Germany\u2019s stance on Europe.\u201d The argument here is that any German government will revert to the mean, and to the stasis, of the Merkel years. This may happen, but the signs are that the new team has greater ambitions in Europe than that. Baerbock is a strong Europhile. When asked where her first call would be as Chancellor, she said, \u201cto Brussels because German foreign policy must always be European.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n In her first visit to Brussels as Germany's Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock reaffirmed her country's support for NATO, saying the alliance is an "indispensable pillar" for Europe's security. pic.twitter.com\/9oGNymJYV8<\/a><\/p>\n — DW News (@dwnews) December 11, 2021<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\nThe future of Germany’s foreign policy<\/h2>\n
Merkel\u2019s legacy<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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