Will Putin Run Out of Money?

When Russia brutally attacked Ukraine in February 2022, the Western powers responded by imposing the broadest and, as it was then believed, the most effective sanctions on Moscow. In this article, Vladislav Inozemtsev analyzes the efficiency of these sanctions based on the results they produced over the last two years.

The Russian Central Bank’s reserves of around $290 billion were frozen,[1] all the main international credit card companies discontinued their business in Russia,[2] and a bit later all the major Russian banks were cut off from the SWIFT clearance network.[3] Between March 2022 and January 2023, many Western nations introduced embargoes on Russian oil, oil products, coal and, in some cases, natural gas.[4] All these measures,alongside with many others, were aimed at a single issue: to make Putin short of money for running his state-managed economy and for funding the Russian army as the military expenditures ballooned from Rub3.6[5] to 10.8 trillion[6] (or from $49 to $117 billion) between 2021 and 2024. Western policy makers believed that the Russian budget had been filled almost exclusively by the energy export revenues and hoped that the freezing of the reserves would send the ruble into a downward spiral, causing long-term double-digit inflation. After 2.5years of the war, it seems that all this has been a series of miscalculations. In Q1 2024, the Russian economy grew by 5.4 percent[7] after advancing by 3.6 percent in FY2023;[8] Russian businesses reported an all-time high profit of Rub33.3 trillion,[9] or 19.6 percent of the GDP for 2023; the federal budget recorded a Rub867 billion surplus in March 2024,[10] and there are no signs of the Kremlin being short of money.


Why did the Western political elite fail so profoundly? I would argue that there were several quite important reasons for this (I would focus on the five most obvious), with almost all of them being predictable from the onset of the war.

The first one concerns the currency reserves and the exchange rates. Prior to the conflict, Russia possessed one of the largest currency reserves in the world, estimated at $643 billion.[11] The amassing of reserves has notbeen all that necessary since at any given time Russia has generated a stable foreign trade surplus and therefore its national currency, the ruble, came under pressure from time to time mostly for geopolitical, and not so much for economic, reasons. The reserves were not used by its Central Bank and many experts repeatedly called them excessive.[12] As a solid portion of them was blocked by the European authorities, the ruble lost close to half of its value in several days[13] – but only until the Ministry of Finance ordered the exporters to sell 80 percent of their hard currency proceeds for the rubles[14] almost immediately after the money was credited to their accounts in Russian banks, and simultaneously imposed a ban on Russian citizens on wiring dollars and euros abroad, onbuying foreign cash and even on withdrawing more than $10k from hard currency accounts in Russia.[15]

The Western sanctions actually helped Russian financiers as the ban on credit card transactions significantly curtailed the capital outflow.

At the same time, the start of the war and the steps by the West sent energy prices up withBrent breaking through $133/barrel,[16] thus increasing Russia’s oil and gas revenues. This complicated – and largely unexpected – combination of factors produced an enormous oversupply of dollars and euros in Russia which started to push the ruble up from its lows. In late April 2022, the Russian currency broke through the pre-war rate of Rub 76.2 to the dollar and went further up, reaching Rub51.2 to the dollar in late June[17] – a level not seen since May 2015. This all made the ruble the world’s best performing currency against the dollar in 2022.[18]

This tremendous achievement, secured by increasing state regulation of the financial sphere (one should recall that the sell-off of export revenues that had been already practiced in Russia in the 1990s, was abolished back in 2006),[19] heralded a long-term shift from an almost unregulated financial market that existed in Russia between 2007 and 2021, to a more controlled one. Its major outcome was a return to price stability as the monthly rise in consumer prices that jumped to 7.6 percent in March 2022, was evaporated by May and substituted by three consecutive months of deflation from June through August.[20] From this point on there was no doubt that the first assault on the Russian financial system had been countered. Western sanctions against Russian foreign debt later contributed further to the ongoing revival. For a reason which I cannot explain, US authorities banned the servicing of the Russian debt forcing Russia into default,[21] but allowing Putin to savebillions of dollars as the Kremlin was consequently unable to wire the interest payments to the Western investors. During 2022 and 2023, the pressure on the Russian financial system increased – but this was pressure primarily aimed at disconnecting it from the global financial system. If, however, the declared task was to stripPutin of ‘his’ money, who would have thought that it would be achieved by sealing all the leaks through which these funds might leave Russia, draining its finances? Of course, as the Russian financial system became more isolated, Putin unexpectedly found himself in a country full of money from which the budget could borrow almost as much as it needed (I will return to this point later but it has to be mentioned that currently the private deposits in the Russian banks exceed the federal budget deficit for 2023 by almost 13 times – while in the United States the ratio of the FDIC-insured deposits[22] to the current federal budget deficit[23] is somewhat lower, at roughly 10 times).

The second quite important issue was the situation on the crucial ‘front’ for Putin – Russia’s foreign tradebalance which the sanctions were inclined to deteriorate. For years, Russia had been selling to the rest of the world more goods than it was buying from it – even in the times when President Yeltsin’s government defaulted on its domestic debt back in 1998, everything went well for Russian exporters. The average annual foreign trade surplus amounted to $45.7 billion between 1997 and 2001, rising to $109.8 billion for 2002-2006, and touching $174.2 billion between 2007 and 2011 when it reached a plateau standing at around $170 billion a year between 2012 and 2021 – while in 2022 it set a spectacular record of $332.4 billion.[24] This result was mainly caused by Western actions: on the one hand, the oil embargo announced in mid-2022, and the natural gas crises evolving since March 2022, increased energy prices in Europe from which Russia became the largest beneficiary; and on the other hand, the export restrictions curtailed Russia’s imports and therefore expanded the trade surplus. The capital flight, even though it had reached extremely high levels in 2022, was $91 billion less than the trade surplus, and this difference was around 70 percent higher than the 2010s average.[25] This all created a “new equilibrium”: while the overall amounts of exports fell in 2023 and will remain at lower levels compared to 2022, for many years to come, Putin feels himself comfortable for two main reasons.

The West, first of all, failed to crush Russia’s energy exports during the time of war.

Back in October 2022, I argued that the idea of the “oil price cap” was a non-flyer,[26] because everybody in the world needs oil, and its supply cannot meet  demand if around 7.3m barrels of Russia’s daily supplies[27] disappear from the market.Since Russia had offered hefty discounts to buyers, there was little doubt it could circumvent any kind of sanctions. This is exactly what happened in early 2023 as India alone increased the intake of Russian oil by 31 times[28] succeeding even in reselling it to… Germany.[29] Turkey, Singapore and Thailand, who had never been oil exporters, suddenly emerged as Europe’s new sources of gasoline and gas oil. Moreover, starting frommid-2023, discounts on Russian oil began to decline, coming down from more than $30/barrel in early 2023 to less than $16/barrel in March 2024.[30] By early 2024, Russia had more or less restored its energy exports, except for natural gas ones which were harmed by both European policies and US sanctions targeting LNG producers and the “shadow fleet” of outdated tankers Moscow had assembled for remaining safe from restrictions imposed on foreign transport companies (in Q1, 2024 the oil- and gas-revenues of the federal budget stood at a whopping 82 percent above the same figure for 2023).[31]

Additionally, the Russian government almost immediately enacted several steps that decreased the country’s dependence on Western rules concerning its import policies.

As early as 30 March 2022, the Russian government allowed so-called “parallel imports”,[32] the importation of Western goods bypassing authorized dealers. One could therefore buy, for example, iPhones in Brazil and ship them to Russia without the producer’s consent and knowledge. The trade flows from the Western economies towards Turkey, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia exploded as these countries became the largest intermediaries in trade with Russia. Simultaneously, the Russian government allowed Russian companies not to pay royalties to Western for using their intellectual property[33]: from the Western software to the Western movies that are shown now in Russia in pirated copies. All of this also cut the cost of imports and increased the profits of the Russian companies from which the government collects more taxes. I would put it firmly: since the start of the war, the losses the Western companies encounter in Russia are becoming the Russian government’s revenues, thus fueling Putin’s war. And,frankly speaking, I cannot see any effective measures that might change this situation in the foreseeable future.

The third point addresses the core element of Putin’s war economy: military expenditures. For years, Western analysts presumed, for whatever reasons, that the Russian government had to oversee the sell-off of Russian oil on the global markets, collect dollars into the state budget, sell them for rubles and then use thesefunds to pay the industrialists for producing tanks and shells, as well as to disburse salaries and death gratuities to servicemen. This assessment was wrong, however, from the beginning. Russia pays its military equipment producers, as well as its soldiers in rubles, not dollars – and it can print these rubles in significant quantities[34](I will turn to this point later). The money dispersed drives up the demand for all the stuff needed for manufacturing weapons and ammunition, and increases the consumer demand if one talks about soldiers’ salaries. By means of its own version of “helicopter money”, the government secured the accelerating economic growth and a 7.8-percent increase in real wages in 2023.[35] I would reiterate: a major part of the cost of Russia’smilitary production does not depend on imports – and that which is supplied from China, is paid in rubles or renminbi as 90 percent of the Russia-China trade is now not dollar- or euro-denominated.[36] Even if there is some need for buying Western-produced double-use goods, which are paid in dollars and smuggled into Russia through third countries, their value is so low no one would expect that the decrease in Russia’s export revenues would ever affect these purchases. The entire Western strategy of “preventing Russia from getting its exportsrevenues” has in fact had very little impact on the Kremlin’s ability to finance the ongoing war.

Moreover, the times when the Russian government secured its revenue through collecting export duties on oil and gas are long gone. Since 2012, the government has been pushing forward a so-called ‘tax maneuver’ that was almost finalized by 2022.[37] The essence of the move lies in lowering, and in the end, eliminating, export duties on oil and gas, transferring the gravity toward the severance tax[38] which the government collects regardless of the global oil or gas price. With some exaggeration, it would be accurate to say that there is not much difference these days for tax authorities whether oil is exported as crude, processed at Russian refineries, or used domestically.

One year after another, the Russian budget becomes less dependent on foreign trade – and even while the Russian oil companies still feel the pain, the Ministry of Finance does not, nor does the military-industrial complex.

Many analysts have mentioned that Gazprom, which suffered the most from losing its European market, reported a Rub629 billion loss for 2023[39], seeing it as a sign of Russia’s problems. This is not the case, however, since Gazprom, despite its poor performance, contributed more than Rub 2.5 trillion to the federal budget.[40] The case applies to the Russian LNG projects: the US sanctions hit them hard in November 2023,[41] but the federal budget did not lose a penny as up until 2028 these projects were exempt from federal taxes,[42] which was needed to attract investments from TotalEnergies and other foreign companies. The American authorities are therefore increasingly targeting the French and Japanese, rather than the Russians, in this particular case. So, once again, the task of undermining Russian revenues looks much more complex than it has been seen from Stanford University or the Atlantic Council.

The fourth obstacle deals with the mechanics of Russian economic growth and the budget flows thataccompany it. It seems to many people that if the Kremlin spends money for the military, it is simply lost. In reality, however, the funds injected into military production, create new jobs, and increase salaries while the money paid to soldiers, infiltrates into the poorest regions of the country where the contract servicemen come from (Dmitry Belousov, a well-known economist and the brother of the newly appointed Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, already called the veterans “the new young wealthy”,[43] underscoring the difference between their pay and the average salaries in Russia). The profits of the Russian industrialists are on the rise, and even the omnipresent Russian corruption should be treated differently these days as the stolen funds are not channeled into offshore accounts but rather spent inside Russia, once again fueling economic growth (a debate broke out last year inside the Russian ‘opposition’ on whether it is a good time to fight corruption in Russia – and I strongly argued that today the elimination of corruption will not undermine Putin’s regime but rather increase its military capacities).[44] It is no coincidence that Putin mentioned the tax hikes in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in February:[45] the financing of the war made this possible, and one may expect that the increase of the profit tax from 20 to 25 percent, together with changing the income tax brackets, will increase the federal budget revenues by at least Rub2.5 trillion in 2025 alone.[46]

I have argued in several of my articles earlier this year that the constitution of the Russian ‘war economy’has changed the economic logic of the Russian government a great deal. For years, it assumed that the money spent from the budget should be treated as a pure loss and believed that the lesser both the state and corporations pay the employees, the richer the state becomes (because of this, the share of wages in the Russian GDP decreased from more than 46 percent prior to 2014, to below 39 percent in the wake of the war).[47] The Kremlin currently realizes that, in a sealed economy with many financial ties to the world already cut, it enjoys much larger freedom than before, and can opt for financing its needs through growing deficits, since at least part of the money spent will return through increased tax proceeds. This dramatic change in Kremlin’s economic worldview[48] is seemingly not understood by either the Western mainstream economists or by Russian opposition activists: quite recently during a public debate hosted by the independent website Verstka, Vladimir Milov, a respected economist with the Anti-Corruption Foundation, seriously insisted the profits of the Russian corporate sector are ‘fictitious’ being only ‘invented’ by their book-keepers[49] – but if that is the case, where do the military spendings originate from?

I would argue that as the Russian economy becomes autarchic, the chances for running a sustained federal budget deficit – and therefore the chances for continuing the ongoing war – are increasing, not diminishing.

The fifth, and the last, point I would like to make, addresses some ‘creative methods’ that were already used or could be used by the Russian government for increasing its funding for Kremlin’s military adventures. It might seem crazy, but the Central Bank’s reserves arrested in Europe, may in fact be ‘spent’ in Russia. There is no doubt that some part of the arrested money belonged not to the Central Bank but rather to the government’s reserves, known as the National Wealth Fund administered by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance has authorized the Central Bank to manage these funds by investing it into reliable financial instruments on international markets.[50] Even the arrest of the Central Bank’s reserves did not change anything in relations between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance: in the latter’s books, the money it possesses, in euros or inpounds, is deposited with the Bank of Russia. Therefore, it may still sell its currency assets to the Bank which should provide rubles against them.[51] This means that the arrest of the Central Bank’s funds affects the ruble exchange rate, but not the budget revenues or reserves. Of course, obtaining real rubles selling fictitious euros means pure money issuance and the increase of the M2 monetary aggregate (which has risen significantly in Russia both in 2022 and 2023),[52] but inflation is not considered Russia’s most urgent matter these days.

The Ministry of Finance also currently borrows money on the domestic market at a rate lower than the Central Bank’s key rate (or at around 14.5 percent[53] against 16 percent[54]). If the need arises for borrowing more, however, it can raise the yield offering some premium to the key rate – and this would change the entire picture because of one important peculiarity of the Russian financial system. If, for example, the Ministry of Finance issues its OFZ (or Federal Loan Bonds) yielding 17 percent per annum, the banks can buy them even they do not possess enough of their own funds, as they can immediately deposit the bonds in the Central Bank as a first-class collateral[55] against a 16-percent loan from the Bank. In this case, the Ministry of Finance will pay the yield almost entirely to the Central Bank – and the latter, according to Art. 26 of the Law on the Bank of Russia, has to contribute ¾ of its annual profit to the federal budget,[56] thus decreasing the real borrowing costs to around 5 percent per annum which is far less than the current official inflation rate of 8 percent.[57] And all this, I would argue, are the easiest means to counter the financial shortages in today’s Russia as some more sophisticated ones could be offered as well.

In order to therefore answer the question that was posted as this article’s title, I would argue that: Putin willnot run out of money. He will not encounter any crucial problems with Russian budget resources until the end of his ‘new’ presidential term, and, in all probability, until the end of his life – which, as the Russian Patriarch Kirill had observed recently, will also mark the end of his stay in the Kremlin. In addition to what has already been said, I want to make several more remarks explaining the general causes of the current condition.

The Russian economy of the 2020s differs dramatically from the Soviet economy of the 1980s – which, Iwould say, might have collapsed if facing the challenges the Russian economy now encounters. The crucialdifference between the two consists in the role the private sector plays in today’s Russia. It employs around 60 percent of the workforce and is extremely flexible compared to state-controlled entities.[58] Back in 2022, whensanctions were first imposed and thousands of supply chains broke down, private entrepreneurs did their best to restore them as soon as possible since no one could afford her or his business to collapse. These privateenterprises emerged from the Western-inspired 1990s reforms – but today they are the most important pillar of Putin’s regime since their owners are ready to do almost anything they can to save their companies – and, through this, the entire Russian economy.

Classical Western economics still insists that private property is the basis of political freedom, but in Putin’s Russia it has turned into a ground for serfdom,[59] as the owners decide to serve Russia’s Fascist regime[60] rather than lose all they have earned over the last thirty years.

These private enterprises employ people and pay taxes thus subsidizing the Russian state rather than being subsidized by it, as it was during Soviet times. Therefore, the money spent on the military appears to be not a deduction from the national wealth, but the cause of its increase, as it happens in other market economies[61] (One should recall that in the US the economy received a huge push from the First and the Second World Wars as the enormous military spendings fueled private enterprises). I would argue that in today’s Russia the military allocations are by any standards not too excessive for a developed market economy – at 6.7 percent of GDP[62] they equal the US ratio of military spendings to GDP in 1986[63] – during the times when the Cold War was basically over.

The Russian economy these days is all that dependent on its energy or agricultural exports as many Western analysts used to think. The government may collect enough money for the war from domestic economic activity even if the exports are seriously disorganized. When, ten years ago, the late Senator John McCain called Russia “a gas station masquerading as a country”[64] he might have been right, but he forgot that a gas station is a business everyone needs on a daily basis, so it may be possible to sustain the global economy without Russia as a consumer of most part of the Western-produced goods,[65] but it is much more difficult to imagine the world without Russia as a supplier of different kinds of commodities to the global markets. And I will add that even the Soviet Union went bust, not because of the low oil prices, but collapsed due to profound failures in its economic organization; to the failures the Russian leadership has constantly avoided. I would admit that if Russia cut off all of its exports, if millions more Russians leave the country, and if the sanctions that prevent the capital flight from the country are lifted, Putin might face severe challenges – but for this to happen, the Western world should come to terms with the fact that its own losses will greatly exceed Russia’s ones (the energy crisis of 2022 is proof as it increased Russian exports by $98.4 billion and the Russian budget revenues by Rub2.5 trillion while costing European nations up to €800 billion).[66] If such perspectives are not pleasing to Western policymakers, the task should be rethought as soon as possible.


What would this rethinking look like? In my mind, we need to address the issue from a slightly different angle. When the experts argue that the task is to strip Putin of his money, they indicate just part of the problem – and not the most important one. Money is only a means of securing some productive resources – for buying new technologies, hiring people, producing armaments and ammunition. Therefore, the final aim is to disable the Russian government from achieving all these goals, and not so much making it short of gold or dollars. Moreover, even if the task is put only in its current manner – how one can diminish the amount of money Putincommands – there are two methods for succeeding in this enterprise: on the one hand, we can try to decrease the inflow of funds into Russia, and on the other, we can accelerate its outflow from the country: both trends in fact lead to the same desired outcome. Taking all this into account, we should reformulate the task.

The right goal, which needs to be placed on the current agenda, consists of minimizing the amount of anyproductive resources Putin’s Russia is in possession of.

So, if the attempts to cut off the money flows into Russia fail, we can employ at least three alternative measures.

The first would be to counter the technology transfers to Russia and dry out as much of the trade in high-tech goods with Russia as possible. For this, both the secondary sanctions imposed on third country banks and companies can be used, and some economic stimulus for the nations that comply with the new regime on a voluntary basis. In the case of China, which has emerged as Russia’s most important ally,[67] the US and Europe may use banking sanctions which would force the local banks highly dependent on international business to comply with new regulations or face the closure of all their corresponding accounts in Western financial institutions and exclusion from the SWIFT system (some of these actions have already been taken, causing months-long processing of Russia-related payments in many Chinese financial institutions).[68] In the case of post-Soviet states such as Kyrgyzstan or Armenia, the Western powers can offer either fast-track integration intothe Euro-Atlantic community (which would be a sweet prize for Yerevan) or some extended assistance programs that would be welcomed all over Central Asia.[69] But in all these cases the aim has to be the same: to cut Russia off from Western technology and high-tech goods built through its use. This will reduce the effectiveness of Russian military production and destroy (at least in some sense) the common living standards (here I would also mention the disconnection of the Russian Federation from Western IT solutions and, if possible, disablementof all the Western-produced hi-tech devices until they are physically located inside its borders).[70] The reasonfor these proposals is that the losses originating from the complete loss of the Russian market for Western goods will be many times smaller than the loss stemming from the ban of Russian exports to the world. Without discontinuing the hi-tech supplies to Russia, no one can expect the Russian economic conditions to deteriorate.

The second measure should consist of immediate lifting of all restrictions concerning the use of foreign-based accounts and property by Russian citizens. Most of the sanctions, except those imposed on people that should rather be qualified as war criminals,[71] should be lifted, and the outflow of money from Russia should be encouraged. Both European and US authorities should clear all mid-size deals made by the Russians: for example, the purchases of real estate valued at less than 2-3 million dollars or euros and depositing cash funds by less than 500k dollars or euros. The simplest calculation, made in 2022, indicates that in that year alone Russian citizens had transferred not less than $70 billion from their accounts[72] into mostly Georgian,Armenian, Kazakh, and even Kyrgyzstan banks only in order to obtain payment cards and secure their access to global e-commerce. Would European regulation allow Russians to open accounts in web-based banks – like Revolut, for example – tens of billions of dollars would flow out of Russia every month. One should recall that there are at least Rub47 trillion of private funds deposited in Russian banks[73] and more than $100 billion in dollars and euros held by the public.[74] The opening of the legal capital flight would cause a sell-off of the Russian privately held assets and residential property, thus worsening the business climate, and increasing the pressure on the ruble as the demand for foreign currency rises. I would add that not much here depends on the Russian financial authorities: a well-organized system allowing Russians to send their money out of the country using cryptocurrency transactions is already in place, and the change in strategy will result in formidable consequences.

The third initiative, which might be even more painful for the Kremlin, could target Russian emigration.After Putin announced the so-called ‘partial mobilization’ back in September 2022, up to one million Russian citizens, 80 percent possessing master’s or PhD diplomas, rushed out of the country.[75] Most of them are young and self-made people, sharing Western values and able to integrate into European society. Their exodus had caused profound problems for Russia, and leading government officials confessed by the end of 2023 that the labor force shortage is the most acute structural problem[76] the Russian economy has encountered since the start of the war. Instead of integrating these people, however, European countries (the Czech Republic not being an exemption)[77] restricted visa issuance, banned entrance for Russian passport holders,[78] and even sealed their borders with Russia.[79] By the start of 2024, a substantial part of those who left the country in 2022, hadreturned – and Bloomberg reported that this reverse flow accounted for at least one third of Russia’s encouraging economic growth of 2023.[80] In my mind, if the West wants to dry out Russia’s resources, it has to open its borders to Russians who should be granted residence and work permits (but not citizenship for at least 10-15 years) without a right to obtain access to social security payments from European countries for, at least, fiveyears after they come to Europe.[81] This kind of measure could result in the move of from three to five million Russians to European countries in two to three years, bringing with them not less that $500 billion in cash and assets (I have been analyzing, along with two colleagues, this strategy in a policy paper for the French Institute for International Relations to be presented to the public on June 11). The growing emigration might actuallyforce Putin to close the borders – and this move will significantly contribute to his regime’s decline and demise as it will reinforce internal popular resistance and might provoke a massive move for freedom. This is something which would be quite unexpected in Russia as the quite individual exit from the country remains the most effective personal strategy for resolving the problems caused by Putin’s repressions.

I would not go further with my arguments since it seems clear enough that the task of stripping Russia of its resources was taken in a very straightforward and one-dimensional manner by those responsible for drafting the response strategy to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. I will not talk here about the obvious fact than no aggression was ever effectively countered by economic sanctions alone,[82] and therefore most efforts should be aimed at securing military assistance to Ukraine and not on producing illusions that the Russian military industry will run out of steam (many of the texts arguing that it would appeared in 2022,[83] but now they are quite rare)– but if one wants to drain Russian finances, it can be done much more effectively through accelerating the outflow of money from the country, than by ineffective control over the inflows into it.

  *     *     *     *     *

In conclusion, I would like to state that countering Russia is a difficult task, and if Western policymakers get serious about it, they need to reflect thoughtfully on all the pros and cons involved. Such an analysis has to address various issues and has to be based on the results the sanctions policy produced over the last two years. Western powers should bear in mind that the sanctions can be regarded as an effective measure and will only be backed by people if they inflict more damage on the aggressor country than to the European nations. Otherwise, it is better just to fund Ukraine’s defense while continuing to purchase cheap Russian oil and gas without any administrative restrictions. Without a critical reevaluation of everything that has happened since February 2022, effective protection of the liberty of Ukraine and Europe looks impossible.

Vladislav Inozemtsev, Ph.D. in Economics, serves as a Special Advisor to the Russian Media Studies Project at MEMRI, a Washington (DC)-based think tank.

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/02/26/russia-central-bank-white-house/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/visa-suspends-operations-russia-over-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-05/

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWIFT_ban_against_Russian_banks

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embargo_of_Russian_oil_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

[5] ispolnenie-federalnogo-byudzheta-za-2021-god.pdf

[6] https://www.forbes.ru/finansy/497441-minfin-zaplaniroval-uvelicenie-rashodov-na-oboronu-v-2024-godu-pocti-na-70

[7] https://www.interfax.ru/business/961084

[8] https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38851-rosstat_otsenil_rost_vvp_v_2023_godu_v_36_protsenta

[9] https://realnoevremya.ru/news/304604-rossiyskie-kompanii-v-2023-godu-zarabotali-na-35-bolshe-chem-v-2022

[10] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6634624

[11] Международные резервы Российской Федерации | Банк России (cbr.ru)

[12] Бодался Глазьев с ЦБ: старые споры об отсутствующей экономической политике — EADaily, 27 апреля 2020 — Новости политики, Новости России

[13] RUB=X Interactive Stock Chart | USD/RUB Stock – Yahoo Finance

[14] Как регулировалась обязательная продажа части валютной выручки в России – ТАСС (tass.ru)

[15] Лимит на снятие наличной валюты с банковских вкладов. Как это работает — РБК (rbc.ru)

[16] Brent Crude Oil Prices – 10 Year Daily Chart | MacroTrends

[17] График курса доллара США USD за 10 лет: динамика курса на BestStocks

[18] Russian Ruble is World’s Best Currency This Year – Bloomberg

[19] Как регулировалась обязательная продажа части валютной выручки в России – ТАСС (tass.ru)

[20] Таблицы уровня инфляции (xn—-ctbjnaatncev9av3a8f8b.xn--p1ai)

[21] wsj.com

[22] 2023 Summary of Deposits Highlights (fdic.gov)

[23] The Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2023: An Infographic | Congressional Budget Office (cbo.gov)

[24] Russia’s Vanishing Trade Surplus – Riddle Russia (ridl.io)

[25] Russia’s Vanishing Trade Surplus – Riddle Russia (ridl.io)

[26] Газ замылился. Европа хочет наказать Россию предельной ценой на нефть, но это безболезненный удар. Бить надо было по газу, но делать этого в ЕС не хотят. Интервью Владислава Иноземцева — Новая газета Европа (novayagazeta.eu)

[27] Russian Oil Revenue Hit as Exports Drop to 5-Month Low, IEA Says – Bloomberg

[28] Индия увеличила закупки российской нефти более чем в 31 раз | Forbes.ru

[29] Russland-Sanktionen im Ukrainekrieg: Deutschland importiert offenbar russisches Öl über Indien – DER SPIEGEL

[30] Дисконты нефти Urals в апреле немного снизились к марту, цена выросла (bcs-express.ru)

[31] Illuminating Russia’s Shadow Fleet (windward.ai)

[32] Документы – Правительство России (government.ru)

[33] Как Россия использует интеллектуальную собственность — Реальное время (realnoevremya.ru)

[34] Как российская экономика приспособилась к войне (istories.media)

[35] Реальные зарплаты в 2023 году выросли максимально за пять лет — РБК (rbc.ru)

[36] Путин: 90% платежей между Россией и Китаем проходят в рублях и юанях – Российская газета (rg.ru)

[37] 2. Налоговый маневр в нефтяном секторе \ КонсультантПлюс (consultant.ru)

[38] Налоговый манёвр. Зачем нужна нефтяная реформа? | Добывающая промышленность (dprom.online)

[39] «Газпром» впервые за 25 лет получил убыток по итогам года — РБК (rbc.ru)

[40] “Газпром” в 2023 году заплатит 2,5 трлн руб. налогов (cbonds.ru)

[41] Russia Arctic LNG 2 Project Supply Halted by US Sanctions – Bloomberg

[42] А был-ли Форс-мажор по проекту Арктик СПГ 2? • LNGnews.Ru

[43] Как российская экономика приспособилась к войне (istories.media)

[44] Нужно ли бороться с путинской коррупцией в условиях войны? Экономист Владислав Иноземцев вступает в дискуссию ФБК*, Максима Каца и Сергея Пархоменко | Редактор | Republic

[45] Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию • Президент России (kremlin.ru)

[46] Налоговая мобилизация: правительство планирует повысить НДФЛ до 20%, а налог на прибыль — до 25% (istories.media)

[47] Доля оплаты труда в структуре ВВП рекордно сократилась / Экономика / Независимая газета (ng.ru)

[48] Вот и пришел тот самый черный день, или Об очередной удаче Кремля – Русская служба The Moscow Times

[49] Владимир Милов vs Владислав Иноземцев / Спор об экономике (youtube.com)

[50] «Недружественную» валюту убрали из ФНБ – Коммерсантъ (kommersant.ru)

[51] Российские трюки с резервами. Как успешно потратить то, чего нет (svoboda.org)

[52] Денежная масса в РФ в национальном определении в 2023 году выросла на 19,4% – ИА “Финмаркет” (finmarket.ru)

[53] Кривая бескупонной доходности государственных облигаций | Банк России (cbr.ru)

[54] Ключевая ставка Банка России | Банк России (cbr.ru)

[55] Ломбардный список Банка России | Банк России (cbr.ru)

[56] Статья 26 \ КонсультантПлюс (consultant.ru)

[57] Инфляция в РФ в апреле составила 0,5%, годовая на 13 мая превысила 8% (interfax.ru)

[58] Trud_2021.pdf (rosstat.gov.ru)

[59] Ownership and serfdom – Riddle Russia (ridl.io)

[60] Russia’s Flirtation With Fascism by Vladislav Inozemtsev – Project Syndicate (project-syndicate.org)

[61] Как российская экономика приспособилась к войне (istories.media)

[62] Путин заявил, что рост военных расходов не должен сказаться на соцподдержке граждан (interfax.ru)

[63] U.S. Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2024 | MacroTrends

[64] McCain: Russia is a ‘gas station’ – POLITICO

[65] Затопление без «воронки». Правда ли, что мировая экономика не выдержит долгих санкций против России? Отвечает Владислав Иноземцев | Редактор | Republic

[66] Europe’s spend on energy crisis nears 800 billion euros | Reuters

[67] Что Россия продавала Китаю в 2023 году и что покупала у него — РБК (rbc.ru)

[68] В Китае предложили проводить расчеты с Россией через мелкие и новые банки после зависания 80% платежей – Русская служба The Moscow Times

[69] Central Asia: Making Use of a Historic Opportunity | IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales

[70] Rosję czekają nowe sankcje. Jak sprawić, by odniosły pożądany efekt? (wyborcza.pl)

[71] The Milošević Option | Internationale Politik Quarterly (ip-quarterly.com)

[72] В третьем квартале 2022 года россияне вывели из страны почти полтора триллиона рублей. Это в 26 раз больше, чем годом ранее — Meduza

[73] 02_01_Funds_all.xlsx (live.com)

[74] Объем наличной валюты на руках у россиян впервые превысил $100 млрд | Forbes.ru

[75] L’exode du siècle (ifri.org)

[76] Набиуллина назвала главной проблемой экономики РФ нехватку рабочей силы – Ведомости (vedomosti.ru)

[77] Какие страны не выдают визы россиянам в 2024 году (tinkoff.ru)

[78] Четыре страны Евросоюза запретили въезд для россиян — РБК (rbc.ru)

[79] Финляндия закрыла границу с Россией до дальнейшего уведомления: Мир: Путешествия: Lenta.ru

[80] Russians Who Fled Abroad Return in Boost for Putin’s War Economy – Bloomberg

[81] Exilrussen in Europa: Sechs Dinge, die EU-Politiker wissen sollten – DER SPIEGEL

[82] Report (ecgc.info)

[83] A farewell to arms: Russia will be left almost without shells, artillery and armored vehicles by year-end (theins.ru)

Vladislav Inozemtsev

Vladislav Inozemtsev, Ph.D. in Economics, serves as a Special Advisor to the Russian Media Studies Project at MEMRI, a Washington (DC)-based think tank.

He was the founder and director at the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow. He chaired the Department for World Economy and International Trade at the Moscow State University’s School of Public Governance and taught at various universities, including MGIMO and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He is a member of the Russian International Affairs Council. Since 1991, he authored 15 books, four of which were translated into English. He regularly contributes to Vedomosti and RBCDaily newspapers in Moscow, as well El Pais, Internationale Politik, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Gazeta Wyborcza, The American Interest, Foreign Affairs and other periodicals in Europe and the U.S.

Share this on social media

Support Aspen Institute

The support of our corporate partners, individual members and donors is critical to sustaining our work. We encourage you to join us at our roundtable discussions, forums, symposia, and special event dinners.

These web pages use cookies to provide their services. You get more information about the cookies after clicking on the button “Detailed setting”. You can set the cookies which we will be able to use, or you can give us your consent to use all the cookies by clicking on the button “Allow all”. You can change the setting of cookies at any time in the footer of our web pages.
Cookies are small files saved in your terminal equipment, into which certain settings and data are saved, which you exchange with our pages by means of your browser. The contents of these files are shared between your browser and our servers or the servers of our partners. We need some of the cookies so that our web page could function properly, we need others for analytical and marketing purposes.